The Hungarian Theory of Just War Based on the Idea of the Holy Crown by Boda, Mihály
1 
 
The Hungarian Theory of Just War Based on the Idea of the Holy Crown 
 
Mihaly Boda 
 
Department of Military History, Philosophy and Cultural History, National University of 
Public Service, Budapest, Hungary 
boda.mihaly@uni-nke.hu; 1101 Budapest, Hungária krt. 9-11., Hungary. 
Mihaly Boda is currently an Associate Professor of Military Ethics at the National University of Public 
Service, in Budapest, Hungary. He has worked mainly on the topic of military virtues and moral abilities. 
He has also worked on issues such as the ethics of war, warfare, and military ideologies, including just 
war theory, both historical and contemporary. He has a long-standing personal interest in historical 
Hungarian military virtues and warfare ideologies, particularly the idea of the Holy Crown. 
 
  
2 
 
The Hungarian Theory of Just War Based on the Idea of the Holy Crowni 
 
Abstract 
 
Warfare ideologies are as old as human civilization. By now, they have grown into an important 
and extended research field, as many works were written in the near past, including for example 
ones analyzing the justification of war in ancient Indian epic literature, empire-building 
techniques in the Chinese antiquity, the warfare ideology of Islam or Buddhism in Sri-Lanka. 
Similar works concerning Hungarian historical ideologies are not without attempts, but a 
comprehensive survey remains to be seen. In this paper I present a special Hungarian warfare 
ideology which is based on the idea of the Holy Crown, with the help of the concepts of the just 
war theory. 
 
Keywords: just war theory, idea of the Holy Crown, Hungarian warfare ideology 
 
The theory of just war 
 
Every country, state, or empire applied in the past, applies, and is presumably going to use 
theoretical constructions by which these countries seek to justify their military activities. These 
theoretical constructions can be analyzed as warfare ideologies. One of them is the just war 
theory, which is one of the most detailed and elaborated warfare ideologies. 
We can trace the origin of this theory back to the ancient times, and its development has 
been more or less persistent ever since. According to the most recent form of the theory, the 
question of justice can be raised regarding the preparation for, unleashing of, waging of and 
abandoning warfare. The different parts of war are related to the different questions of justice, 
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like warfare preparation to ius ante bellum, starting warfare to ius ad bellum, waging war to ius 
in bello, and abandoning fighting to ius post bellum (see Lucas 2015, 45-132, Johnson and 
Patterson 2015). These different forms of justice have various parts as well. For example, the 
justice of preparation includes problems of the moral nature of commanding hierarchy or the 
method of recruitment; justice of unleashing a war contains questions of the just cause of war 
and the related intention, and the legitimate authority who has the right to judge the nature of 
the cause; the justice of waging war includes problems like the discrimination between 
combatants and non-combatants; and finally, the justice of abandoning fighting is related to 
ideas, like reparation and punishment. 
Points of view of warfare justice, which emerged along with the development of just war 
theory from the antiquity, can be distinguished from the content of the special warfare justice 
of just war theory (Frowe 2011, 50). For example, according to Augustine of Hippo and other 
authors in the Middle Ages, punishment is the main just cause for war, however, today it is 
commonly thought that the protection of rights is better grounded as a just cause (if punishment 
has any significance at all). This difference in the content, however, does not affect the applied 
formal feature, the just cause of war, which is a morally important point of view to make moral 
judgement on the justice of war. Consequently, formal features emerged during the European 
history of thinking on just war, but they are relevant to other theories of warfare justice as well 
as analyzing tools. 
 
The Hungarian theory of just war 
 
The principal aim of this paper is to analyze a special – Hungarian – form of warfare theory, 
the idea of the Holy Crown, with the help of the formal feature of just war theory. After the 
analysis we will find the Hungarian warfare theory has the same formal categories as the just 
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war theory. For this reasons, we can call this theory as the just war theory based on the idea of 
the Holy Crown, or Hungarian just war theory. 
Just war theory based on the idea of the Holy Crown is a theoretical construction, which, in 
this form did not appear at all in Hungarian history. Hungarian state leaders, political thinkers 
or historians, however, did use some forms of this theory, and in most of the cases with the 
same core content. Therefore, what I propose in this article is to collect the different references 
to the idea of the Holy Crown in connection with warfare or foreign policy, and to elaborate 
these mentions into a coherent theory. 
The idea of the Holy Crown has its origin in the Christian Middle Ages. The King’s crown 
had some symbolic role as early as the period of the early Árpád’s (11-12th centuries), but at 
that time the Holy Crown did not exist (Árpád was the founder of the first ruling dynasty of the 
Kingdom of Hungary in the Middle Ages, he lived in the second half of the 10th century). We 
do not know any documents in which there is a reference to the King’s crown in connection 
with wars, however, in a 11th century piece of written work of the style of Mirrors of King, 
which is attributed to (Saint) Stephen I (who was a descendant of Árpád, and the founder of the 
Christian Hungarian kingdom at 1000/1001), there is a reference to the King’s crown as the 
communal and God-required standards of domestic politics (Szent István 2014, ch. 1.). Stephen 
conducted Christian, holy-war style campaigns against the pagan and Byzantine Christine 
warlords of some Hungarian tribes, which one could naturally consider at that time as having 
the communal and God-required standards as well. But, since we do not have any primary 
documents to base this reasoning, we cannot claim that Stephen’s holy wars are justified by the 
idea of the Holy Crown. 
(Saint) Stephen I was canonized in 1083, under king (Saint) Ladislaus I, who likewise was 
canonized in 1192 under king Béla III. At the end of the 12th century a new idea was created 
based on the canonizations, the idea of ‘the clan of the saintly kings’, which did not refer to 
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single kings but to the whole Árpád dynasty. Partly under this idea Béla III took the cross and 
swore an oath to lead crusade to the Holy Land, which was kept by his son Andrew II in 1217-
18 who took part in the first phase of the fifth crusade. 
By the 13th century the genealogical line originated from Árpád had weakened and confused, 
and to be a king one had to prove his kinship with the ruling dynasty and had to hold the king’s 
crown. This is because the king’s material crown, in that time it was already the Holy Crow 
constructed possibly under the reign Béla III, gained a new role. It was seen as the crown of 
(Saint) Stephen I and (Saint) Ladislaus I and which was bearing the authority for the Hungarian 
throne: who had the Holy Crown, had the right to rule the country. 
Hence we can observe the early development of the idea of the Holy Crown as the Hungarian 
form of just war thinking at the end of the 14th century in the Hungarian military history. The 
idea had gained a more definitive form by the end of the 19th century, since when it has been 
referred to as the doctrine of the Holy Crown (and not just ‘idea’). The doctrine, which looked 
back to the other expressions of the idea of the Holy Crown as its predecessor proposed, first 
of all, the inclusion of the basics of the Hungarian public law theory. The public law of Hungary 
had some connections with the foreign policy of the state, however, it primarily gave theoretical 
shape to the relations of king, citizens, and state, so it hinted at domestic politics (see Péter 
2003).  
The idea of the Holy Crown developed with a double nature from the origin: on the one hand 
it claimed universal Christian justification for the political activity of political leaders; on the 
other it gave particularly ‘national’ justification for political activity which targeted the parts of 
the Christian Kingdom of Hungary and its direct surroundings. This can be the implication of 
the undertaken mission of the young Hungarian Kingdom (‘the young plantation of 
Christianity’ as the Hartvic legend reads (Hartvic 2000: 381)) on the periphery of Christian 
Europe. (Saint) Stephen I, the first king of Hungary, defined this role as converting this part of 
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Europe into Christianity and maintaining it in Christianity. Hence the mission of Hungary 
involves a special peripheric territory and the universal idea of Christianity, and this mission 
descended to the idea of the Holy Crown. 
Below I pay less attention to the public law dimension of the idea of the Holy Crown, and 
endeavor to emphasize the foreign policy- and warfare-related aspects. To do this I am relying 
on the theory of the famous just war theoretician of the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas. 
 
Just war theory in the Middle Ages: the summary of the theory of Thomas Aquinas 
 
The theory of Thomas Aquinas is only one of the summaries in the 13th century (Russell 1975, 
218-224, Barnes 1997), but without doubt, it has the greatest influence. According to Aquinas, 
a war is just if it started on the command of the sovereign with legitimate authority; it is started 
by the sovereign for a just cause; and the intention of the sovereign is right, that is the intention 
to go to war is to promote the good and impede the wrong (Aquinas 2013, 177). 
The rule of legitimate authority lays down the scope of the person or group of people who 
are morally speaking eligible to start a war. According to Aquinas the sovereign prince has the 
legitimate authority, his role in unleashing a war comes from his responsibility for the common 
good. On this responsibility, only the sovereign prince has the right to protect the common 
good, private persons do not. Since external enemies, as much as internal rebels, can jeopardize 
the common good, the sovereign has the same right to encounter both internal rebels and 
external enemies (Johnson 2003, 7-13). 
The rule of just cause, which is the most important rule nowadays, is on the second place in 
the theories of the Middle Ages, so we find it in the theory of Aquinas as well. According to 
Aquinas, among the many possible causes of war only those are just which are in connection 
with the wrong committed by the enemy. The enemy, for this reason, deserves to be attacked. 
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Aquinas’ just causes include the punishment of those who committed wrong, or the restoration 
of what is seized unjustly. 
Finally, it is also important that the just warring party, waging a war with right intentions, 
so to speak the sovereign’s intention, should tend to peace, and should abstain from greatness, 
cruelty, or vengefulness. Aquinas distinguished two meanings of right intention, the positive 
meaning of endeavoring for Christian peace (based on the virtue of charity – love of God and 
the neighbors – and including concord (Aquinas 2013, 171-175)), and the negative meaning of 
evading evil motivations. One ground of this distinction is the difference between ius ad bellum 
and ius in bello, because endeavoring for peace is part of the requirements of ius ad bellum, but 
evading evil motivations is part of ius in bello. 
 
Hungarian just war theory 
 
We can find the details of Hungarian just war theory in historical documents. These details are 
mostly analyzable with the help of the ius ad bellum requirements of just war theory, so I am 
going to use Aquinas’ ius ad bellum expectations: legitimate authority, just cause and right 
intention. Regarding the right intention requirements, I am going to apply only the ius ad bellum 
part of it. 
 
Legitimate authority of unleashing war: king, nobility, king and nobility, king and national 
community, governor and Parliament 
 
According to the Hungarian just war theory the legitimate authority of unleashing a war 
changed with the political sovereignty in the course of history. For the first time the idea of the 
Holy Crown appeared in the second half of the 14th century as a justification of wars, in János 
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Küküllei’s work on king (Great) Louis I (Angevin) of Hungary (Küküllei was a notary in the 
Royal Chancellery in the second half of the 14th century). Based on this text we can claim that 
the Hungarian kings of the Angevin dynasty (first of all (Great) Louis I) had the legitimate 
authority to make decisions on starting a war, because Küküllei’s work referred to the Holy 
Crown when describing Louis’ wars (Küküllei 2000, 30-31). 
After the Middle Ages, the Hungarian political power changed in several occasions, on 
which the theoreticians of the idea of the Holy Crown, like István Werbőczy, Péter Révay, Ákos 
Timon or Kálmán Molnár, responded. Their theories usually focused on the problem of the 
person who was (or should have been) the holder of political sovereignty in Hungary, and 
indirectly, who had (or should have had) legitimate authority for unleashing a war. Below I 
examine their theories based on the former aspect, supposing at the same time that the owner 
of political sovereignty has the right, and consequently the legitimate authority to start a war. 
In the 15-16th centuries, due to social changes, the king’s formerly held political power 
significantly decreased in line with the accession of the political power of the nobility. The 
work of István Werbőczy, a legal expert and a royal jurist, at the beginning of the 16th century, 
expressed this change. According to Werbőczy the king can refer to the Holy Crown as a 
justification of his actions (like starting wars), because the nobility „… and then was transferred 
by the community, out of its own authority, to the jurisdiction of the Holy Crown of this realm 
and consequently to our prince and king, the right and full power of ennoblement, and therefore 
of donating estates …, together with the supreme power and government” (Werbőczy 2005, 
51). Werbőczy thought the king ruled the country and exercised the royal rights (including the 
right of unleashing war) because the nobility had previously elected him to be king. Therefore, 
the real sovereign is not the king but the nobility, who nevertheless transferred its ruling rights 
to a king by the coronation (Werbőczy 2005, 229). 
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One hundred years after Werbőczy, at the beginning of the 17th century, a new turn on the 
idea of the Holy Crown appeared in the work of Péter Révay (who was the főispán (comites, 
sheriff) of Turóc County and Keeper of the Holy Crown at the beginning of the 17th century). 
Révay more or less agreed with Werbőczy regarding the significance of the nobility, but he 
emphasized the importance of the king as well (Révay 1979, 228). According to Révay, the 
Holy Crown was the personified incarnation of Providence (God) which had virtues like piety, 
honesty, justice, loyalty, and austerity. These virtues of the Holy Crown were the common 
standards for the king and the nobility in ruling the country. When previously the governing 
powers had not adhered to these standards, for example when there had been partisan struggle 
in the kingdom, the Crown left the country, and the country became demolished. As the Crown 
came back, the order of the country was restored, and the country prospered again. There were 
several Crown-comebacks in the Hungarian history, the latest for Révay happened when the 
King of Hungary (Habsburg) Matthias II regained it at the beginning of the 17th century. This 
comeback of the Holy Crown symbolically settled the war between the king and the nobility, 
and the intervention of the external enemy (that of the Turks in the Fifteen Years War, a.k.a. 
Long Turkish War (1591-1606)) (Révay 1979, 206., 211., 227-228). 
Werbőczy’s idea of the Holy Crown was quite popular and vivid even at the very beginning 
of the 20th century, with some new insights in the work by Ákos Timon, a jurist and historian 
of law. According to Timon, the idea of the Holy Crown, or as he called it, the ‘mystery of the 
Holy Crown’, expresses the special Hungarian political spirit, the communality, which was 
featuring the Hungarian political thinking from the early Middle Ages (Timon 1907, 5-6). 
Therefore, Timon saw the king and the Hungarian nation together as the political sovereign, 
and thought the members of nation are the ‘whole Hungarian nation’, who had privileges in 
Hungary at that time. Werbőczy also discussed the Hungarian ‘nation’, but in the sense of 
nobility, emphasizing the ideology that all members of the nobility are equal in political rights, 
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and so constitute the ‘nation’. Timon extended the membership of the nation, and incorporated 
all the Hungarian residents into it. 
Finally, the idea of the Holy Crown between the two world wars turned once more in line 
with the change of political sovereignty. After the First World War the form of Hungarian 
government remained monarchy, but without king, and was headed by admiral Miklós Horthy, 
the regent. Kálmán Molnár, a public lawyer of that age, accepted the idea of the Holy Crown 
of Timon’s version as a starting point, but referring to the nation-part of political sovereignty 
he narrowed it to Parliament, and modified it by replacing the king with the regent (Molnár 
1927, 10-11). 
Summing up the legitimate authority rule of the Hungarian just war theory we can say that 
parallel with the changes in the political sovereignty the legitimate authority also changed 
during the Hungarian history: in the Middle Ages it was the king who held this authority, then 
the nobility, and finally some composition of the king/ regent and nation/ Parliament. 
 
Just cause for starting war: conquering, repressing rebellion, defending country, reconquering, 
insurrection and war for independence  
 
It is commonly held that starting a war is offensive in nature, however there is at least one 
significantly different approach as well. According to Clausewitz it is not the attacker who starts 
the war, because he would not fight if he had other ways to achieve his (for example) territorial 
purposes. The beginner of war is the defender, because he starts to counter the attacker and 
begins to fight (Clausewitz 1989, 370). We can take either of these approaches as the narrow 
meaning of starting a war, and together these two represent the broad meaning. I understand 
starting a war in the broad sense, so I take attacking (conquering), starting defense, rebelling, 
insurrection (and repressing these), and reconquering as forms of it. 
11 
 
The idea of the Holy Crown was usually used for justifying defensive wars, however, some 
offensive claims were offered as well, as one can find in Péter Révay’s work. According to 
Révay the Holy Crown „… in the same century waged victorious wars on purpose with savage 
peoples for faith and salvation; by Its dignity It defeated or held in check the Venetians, the 
Greeks, the Russians, the Sarmatians, the Cumans and other nearby peoples” (Révay 1979, 
203). From Révay’s list it is worth underlining the wars against Venice for Croatia and Dalmatia 
(at the turn of the 11-12th centuries), and the war of Andrew II in Halych-Volhynia (‘Russia’). 
In these wars the beginning of the Hungarian conquest appeared as the nobility of Croatia, 
Dalmatia, or Halych-Volhynia called in the Hungarians into their country, offering it to submit 
to the Kingdom of Hungary. For example (Saint) Ladislaus I was called in Croatia by a party 
of the Croatian nobility in 1091 who then crowned Koloman I in 1105; or the Dalmatian cities 
Trau and Spoleto voluntarily joined the Kingdom of Hungary in 1105, and a party of the nobility 
of Halych-Volhynia freely requested Andrew II to help them in the internal chaos (Bárány 2012, 
344-345, 350). The cause of conquest in these occasions was the request for support by the local 
nobility, but according to Révay the Hungarian justification of the conquest could be based on 
the Christian dignity and highness of the Holy Crown, because of which other people would 
have liked to submit themselves to the Kingdom of Hungary. According to Révay, the Holy 
Crown is the incarnation of Providence (God), so it bears the dignity and highness of Providence 
(God), and it has its influence on other people’ political thinking.  
Apart from some example, however, the idea of the Holy Crown was not applied to justify 
offensive wars, but only other types of warfare. One of these was repressing rebellions. János 
Küküllei, speaking generally on life of (Great) Louis I, emphasized that the king „began to 
thinking and to chew over in his soul how and on what way He would set back and restore, 
trusting in the help of the God, those rights of the country, which … the rebels and infidels, with 
reckless dedication, snatched and usurped with causing harm for the Holy Crown” (Küküllei 
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2000, 11). This quotation shows that the key point of the idea of the Holy Crown in the Middle 
Ages was the principle that ‘the territories of the country are the territories of the Holy Crown, 
of which voluntary detachment from the country is a rebellion and infidelity, against which the 
legitimate authority has the right to fight’. Based on this principle Louis I waged wars in 
Wallachia, and Croatia. 
The logic of justification of defensive and reconquering wars was based on the same track, 
with a special reference to the external enemy, instead of the internal rebels. Küküllei applied 
the idea of the Holy Crown in justifying the defense of Halych-Volhynia and Lodomeria 
(Küküllei 2000, 30). We can find justification for reconquering warfare in Küküllei’s work as 
well, e.g. the war against Venice for Dalmatia (1356-57), but this type of warfare (claims or 
campaigns) featured more the 19-20th centuries, and paradigmatically the age before the First 
World War, and the beginning of the Second World War. 
Before the First World War, in the so called Age of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the claims 
of reconquering concerned the side-countries of the Kingdom of Hungary, like Croatia, Galicia, 
Lodomeria, Cumania, Wallachia, Bessarabia, Bulgaria. These claims suited well the 
international legal thinking of that age, because according to Emer de Vattel, a state can acquire 
new territories only with a just war, and cannot with an unjust war or precriptively (Vattel 2008, 
388). These countries were conquered by the Kingdom of Hungary, or became vassal states of 
the Kingdom in the Middle Ages. During the Turkish wars (1521-1718) Hungary lost most of 
these territories, which finally became parts of the Habsburg Empire (Dalmatia, Croatia, 
Galicia, Transylvania, Határőrvidék (militärgrenze)), or independent states (Bulgaria, Serbia, 
Bosnia and Hercegovina). Hungary did not regain these territories, with the exception of Bosnia 
and Hercegovina, yet the reconquering claim, partly based on the idea of the Holy Crown, was 
expressed (Unnamed author 1901, 1-2).  
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Contrary to these, the claims between the two world wars were aimed not at the previously 
owned countries, but to those former territories where the majority of the local population was 
Hungarian. These territories (Upper Hungary, Subcarpathia, Southern Territories, and 
Transylvania) were detached by the Treaty of Trianon at the end of the First World War. At the 
beginning of the Second World War the Kingdom of Hungary regained these territories, which 
acts were justified by the idea of the holy Crown, as the acts on the reannexations show (Lemkin 
2005, 144-153).1 
Finally, the idea of the Holy Crown was used not only to justify repressing rebellions, but 
also to justify insurrections and wars of independence. During the 17-19th centuries the 
proclamations of Hungarian insurrections against the Habsburg Empire and wars of 
independence referred to the recovery of the “ancient freedom of Hungary”, by which at first a 
special political status was requested, and after the refusal of this claim, full independence. 
Direct reference to the idea of the Holy Crown, however, can be found only in the middle of 
the 19th century, in the work by Béla Szabó, a public lawyer of that age. Szabó expressed the 
claim for the special political status of Hungary in the Habsburg Empire in 1848. According to 
Szabó, the Habsburg kings were not: concerned with reattaching the territories regained from 
the Turks (Transylvania, Dalmatia, Határőrvidék (militärgrenze)); ruling Hungary in 
accordance with the Hungarian laws, customs and wills of Hungarians; and giving opportunities 
to the national movements. There are two and a half solutions to these problems for Szabó: „we 
have two ways to cease the unlawful status quo, there is not a third one, and out of which we 
 
1 Act XXXIV November 12, 1938. on the Reincorporation into the Country of the Territories of Upper Hungary, 
Returned to the Hungarian Holy Crown (a Magyar Szent Koronához visszacsatolt felvidéki területeknek az 
országgal egyesítéséről); Act VI of June 22, 1939. on the Union with the Country of the Subcarpathian Lands 
Reincorporated into the Hungarian Holy Crown (a Magyar Szent Koronához visszatért kárpátaljai területeknek az 
országgal egyesítéséről); Act XXVI 1940. on the Reincorporation into the Country of the Eastern and Transylvanian 
Territories Returned to the Hungarian Holy Crown (a román uralom alól felszabadult keleti és erdélyi 
országrésznek a Magyar Szent Koronához visszacsatolásáról és az országgal egyesítéséről); Act XX December 27, 
1941. on the Reincorporation of the Recovered Southern Territories into the Hungarian Holy Crown and their 
Unification with the Country (a visszafoglalt délvidéki területeknek a Magyar Szent Koronához való 
visszacsatolásáról és az országgal egyesítéséről). 
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have to choose one: the first is ‘association in every relationship’; – ’autonomy, independence, 
in every relationship’ is the second. … [N]ow I attempt in – this age of – the general endeavor 
to nationalism and perfection of the social state, suggesting that way on which I think the status 
quo can be ceased …” (Szabó 1848, 88-89). The half solution is Szabó’s own one, the core of 
which is the claim that the Holy Crown (and its ‘members’) is ‘who’ has the right of ruling 
Hungary, so the Habsburg kings do not rule but just govern the country (országol), in other 
words, the king is not the owner of Hungarian sovereignty, but only its holder. Because of this, 
the person of the king is ‘inviolable and saint’, but he does not have absolute authority, and has 
to adhere to the laws and will of the Hungarian nation. According to Szabó, the Hungarian 
nation comprises the nobility and every resident of the country (Szabó 1848, chp. III-IV). This 
theory apparently touches upon the problem of legitimate authority, however, the quoted words 
foreshadowed the series of warlike and actually wartime events of 1848 and 1849 (see Bona 
1999). Szabó listed two solutions besides his own to the raised problems, one is the full 
submission of Hungary to the Habsburg Empire, and the other is gaining independence for 
Hungary. Therefore, according to Szabó, if the Habsburg kings do not consider the Hungarian 
(actually Szabó’s) claims based on the idea of the Holy Crown, then the Hungarians can resolve 
the problems via insurrection and a war of independence, namely build their action upon the 
idea of the Holy Crown. 
In this section I claimed that the idea of the Holy Crown was used to justify many forms of 
warfare in the Hungarian history, and it also worked well when it had to secure the intactness 
of the territories of the country. In latter cases, the just causes came from the wrong committed 
by the adversary, for example rebellions or territories unjustly detached. Therefore, the idea of 
the Holy Crown was strongly connected to the actual or previous territories of the Kingdom of 
Hungary, and just faintly regarded as a sound reason for offensive warfare, just in cases when 
one could refer to the dignity and highness of the Holy Crown. However, because dignity and 
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highness in this case are a form of holiness of God, instead of justice, this justification is not a 
form of a just war theory at all, but that of some Christian holy war ideology. 
 
Right intention of unleashing war – striving for peace: rule of virtuous king, Christian peace, 
Hungarian civilizing mission 
 
The third aspect of the medieval just war theory is the right intention of unleashing war. 
According to the theory, the just cause determines the immediate cause of war, but right 
intention defines the farther goal. This farther goal is a just peace, and the right intention of 
starting a war establishes why the peace after the war will be good for the defeated adversary. 
In the framework of the Hungarian just war theory one can distinguish three kinds of right 
intention according to the different peace-conceptions in the Hungarian history. Right intention 
implies, according to János Küküllei, making the adversary become a vassal or a subject of the 
Christian Hungarian king (and the part and member of the Christian Kingdom of Hungary); 
according to Péter Révay, turning them into a part and member of the harmony of the Christian 
Kingdom; and finally, according to Béni Kállay, making them become part and member of the 
Hungarian civilization. 
In the Middle Ages the recurring formula of János Küküllei was that the defeated rebel 
returns to the ‘obedience and loyalty’ or ‘gets back into the grace of’ (Great) Louis I and the 
Holy Crown (Küküllei 2000, 17). The vassal’s obedience and loyalty on one side, and the king’s 
grace on the other are those virtues, which connect the core and peripheral territories of the 
Christian Kingdom of Hungary into a wholeness. The vassal makes vow and helps his king in 
wars and in other areas of political administration and representation, in exchange the king 
treats him with grace (wisely and generously) (Küküllei 2000, 33-34). 
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At the beginning of the 17th century Péter Révay thought there are two farther goals of the 
wars. The first one is a clearly defensive goal and had an outstanding significance to Révay. 
The goal reads as the war should secure (Christian) protection and redemption for the members 
of Hungary (for the nobles) and in connection with this ‘not to disrupt into parties of nobility’, 
or ‘not to buffeting and sink in the sea of rebellion’. Instead, the state has to be integrated and 
in harmony with the internal political goal, and not only to be subjugated to a virtuous Christian 
king. This harmony is saved if the leaders of the political parties regard to the incarnation of 
Godly Providence, hence to the Holy Crown and the standards defined by Its virtues (Révay 
1979, 228). When the political leaders did not respect these standards, then the Holy Crown left 
the country and it merged into civil war (Révay 1979, 203; 208). 
The second farther goal of wars is offensive and had less value for Révay, that to secure the 
protection and redemption for other nation than Hungarian, who, at least in some cases, 
recognized themselves to be in need for protection. Of course, according to Révay this goal had 
had more significance when the Kingdom of Hungary was expanding, in many cases with the 
ideologies of fighting the heretics on the Balkan peninsula or converting heathens in Halych-
Volhynia), for example earlier in the Middle Ages (in the 11-13th centuries), but after the 
expansive period the defensive goal became important only. 
Finally, in the second half of the 19th century, in connection with the military and political 
(re)occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Béni Kállay (who was Minister of Finance of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Governor of Bosnia, and the Member of the Hungarian Academy 
Sciences in the second half of the 19th century) emphasized the double purpose of the 
annexation: a civilizing mission and national surplus. According to Kállay: „… as the 
consequence of setting the civilized circumstances the province fiscal capacity increases soon, 
so by proper administration certain surplus will appear in some years, which can apply to 
necessary investments” (Kállay 1914, 266). Before the years of the occupation, Bosnia was 
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suffering from an ethnically and religiously determined war. Kállay, who was the governor of 
the occupied province from 1882, expressed the idea of civilization of Bosnia, and for this 
reason to produce the Bosnian nation on political grounds, instead of ethnicity. With this 
concept of Bosnian nation, Bosnia was supposed to transcend the problems of ethnical and 
religious conflicts. 
Summing up we can state that the peace-conception which featured the Hungarian history 
and so the right intention of Hungarian just war theory was first of all a Christian mission-
related idea. It was openly Christian before the second half of the 19th century, and in the second 
half of the 19th century it was Christian too, but obliquely, because Hungarian civilization was 
Christian in character (at least partly). 
 
Conclusion: war for mission is a war for justice 
 
In this paper I examined and elaborated the historically based Hungarian just war theory, which 
is the just war theory based on the idea of the Holy Crown. This theory was an outstanding form 
of the Hungarian warfare ideologies from the 14th century to the middle of the 20th century. Its 
core claim is the principle that ‘it is just as a mission to secure the protection and redemption 
for the members of the territories of the Kingdom of Hungary as evolved by the 14th century’. 
Many just war theories base their justification on state (community) rights or human rights, 
or on deserved punishment for wrongdoing. These clear ideas of justice (right and deserve) do 
not necessarily stand conceptual connection with the concept of mission. In the antiquity and 
Middle Ages, however, and other, and more mission-centered form of just war theory appeared. 
This theory explored the claim of justice in the concept of mission to care about others who are 
in some form of need (cf. Ramsey, 1978: 13-14).  
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We can read thus Aristotle saying that it is just for the Greeks to fight the Barbarians in order 
to master them partly for the good of the Barbarians (if the Barbarians refuse the peaceful 
attempt to do this). On this interpretation Barbarians need the slave-master relationship with 
the Greeks and to ground this relationship is the natural duty of the Greeks. Similarly, according 
to Saint Augustine it is just for Christian princes to fight the heretics for their own good partly 
(if heretics refuse to listen to the peaceful Church). Heretics truly need redemption, but due to 
their misconceptions and sins in theoretical and practical matters they miss it, so to attain 
redemption for them is the religious duty of Christian princes. Aristotle (and his successors in 
the early modern period) emphasized the concept of mission which is directed beyond the 
border of the city state (polis) and so it is offensive in nature; and Saint Augustine delivered the 
idea of mission inside Christian empire which contained the whole known world, which is so a 
form of policing. 
Contrary to these approches, Hungarian perception of mission of just wars had bearing on 
special territories which basically belonged to the Christian Kingdom of Hungary from the very 
beginning, or which were conquered earlier in the Middle Ages under the ideology of 
conversion and fight the heretics. The mission was not entirely natural or religious, but partly 
religious and partly ‘national’ or political for the reason it directed to territories with more or 
less definite borders and which had belonged to Christine Kingdom of Hungary. This sort of 
mission is (mainly) defensive in character. 
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